Representation and Explanation in the Sciences

Representation and explanation are distinct notions in the philosophy of science, since the first can be defined as an answer to a how-question, and the second as an answer to a why-question. In particular, the task of providing explanations has been traditionally attributed to scientific theories. These notions, however, are also strictly interrelated, especially because in more recent times the role of theories has been sometimes downgraded to that of simply offering representations or images of physical phenomena and, correspodingly, the role of representations was upgraded to the capability of offering explanations. Several philosophically interesting issues are implicit in these relationships, going from the permanent dispute on scientific realism, to other methodological and even metaphysical, ontological and semantic questions. In order to investigate this topic certain historical reconstructions are very useful, and, in addition, the consideration of different contexts is almost indispensable. These reasons explain the variety of the approaches offered by the papers included in this volume. They can be put in some organic order (as it has been attempted in giving them a particular disposition in the volume), but the greater interest probably resides in the articulated difference of their optics. Becoming acquainted with this variety can constitute a real intellectual enrichment for the reader interested in the philosophy of science.